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Abstract:
This paper examines the impact of remittances on economic growth by looking at time series
data from 1960 to 2012 from the country of Mexico. Using the OLS method, these data will be
analyzed to see what the long term impact of remittances have been on the growth rate of
Mexico. Drawing from the heavily established literature in the field of growth economics, this
paper attempts to show the relevance of such theory in the case of the well documented
phenomenon of remittances. Mexico is the world’s fourth largest net recipient of remittance
inflows and the third largest trading partner of the United States. Although this paper focuses in
particular on Mexico’s growth, it could shed light on the relative success of free trade in the
North American region as well. The results of this study indicate a weakly positive impact of
remittances on economic growth in Mexico.
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1.0 Introduction
Remittances have proven to be a growing phenomenon in the information age where
connectivity between immigrants and their country of origin is stronger than in previous years.
Such remittances become a part of incomes for the families of immigrants and thereby spur
spending and economic growth. This study aims to examine if such a positive effect from
remittances has benefited the economic growth of Mexico over the time from 1960-2012. The
ramifications of a positive impact on economic growth from remittances over this time series for
Mexico may help to build a positive outlook for economic growth even in the face of massive
emigration.
It is a challenge to disentangle the issue of remittances from the employment conditions
of immigrants. Indeed, some studies see remittances as only a part of the story of the effects of
emigration on an economy. This view of remittances is important from a theoretical standpoint
when discussing any impacts they may have on the macro economy. It is crucial to remember
that the act of sending money abroad in the form of a remittance is a very personal economic
decision for immigrants. Not only have many immigrants left their families behind in a search
for different opportunity, many of them left with the promise that they would make efforts to
support their families by sending money back. The difficulties that arise when attempting to keep
such a promise of support are varied and often strong.
One such obstacle for immigrants is the simple act of finding a job that not only offers
wages high enough to survive, but also high enough to send money out of country. For example,
during the recovery from the 2008-09 recession, the Latino unemployment rate in the United
States was 3.4 percentage points higher than the unemployment rate of white workers according
to a Department of Labor Special Report. In general, the report added, the jobs of Latino workers
are much different than those of white workers. For instance, nearly 80% of Latinos work in
private industry. Private industries are driven by market pressures, so many of these workers
work for lower wages than their white, public sector counterparts, resulting in a median wage of
only $549 per week for Latinos, compared to $775 for whites.
Wage gaps in any situation are multifaceted, but in general, the wage gap between
Latinos and whites in the U.S has been largely attributed to standard determinants of wages, such
as education, experience, and demographic makeup. Some of the wage gap is believed to result
from less traditional determinants. In fact, Griener (1984) found that one major determinant of

wages was English-speaking. Using an OLS regression he found that on average, people in the
U.S with Spanish mother-tongue influences make about 7% less than those that do not share such
influences. As the wage gap between Latinos and whites is about 29%, this indicates that a
significant share of income disparity may come from language abilities.
According to the English Proficiency Index, which analyzes and ranks countries based on
their population’s education in and use of the English language, only 2% of adults in Mexico
consider themselves as proficient in English. As this study’s focus is on remittances in Mexico, it
is important to note that Mexican immigrants comprise the majority of Spanish speaking
immigrants to the United States, and that most of these immigrants are beginning their lives in
America with rudimentary knowledge of the most prevalent language in the U.S. This may
weaken their ability to earn the wages necessary for the ability to give remittances.
With the fact that there are many determinants of remittances in mind, this paper now
turns to its primary motivation – assessing the impact of remittances on economic growth in
Mexico. This motivation differs from other research in that it focuses on the country of Mexico
rather than attempting to generalize to a broad panel of countries, and it focuses on longer term
data. A secondary objective of the research is to attempt to relate the results of the regression to
overall trends of remittances in Mexico. The sections that follow (in order of appearance) will:
discuss trends in remittances, related literature on remittances, the data, the empirical model,
empirical results, and conclusions.
2.0 Trends in Remittances
For brevity’s sake and to avoid digression into purely historical, not economic facts of
Mexico this paper will assume a working knowledge of Mexican history before 1960 where the
time series of the data set used begins. A brief history of Mexico from 1960 onwards has been
included. After this general remittance trends from across the globe will be examined, before an
overview of remittance trends in Mexico.
2.1 Mexico from 1960
Political instability was the theme in Mexico until just before WWII where the
constitution was changed to reduce the possibility of dictatorships. This change resulted in
presidents being limited to one six year term. In addition, the government moved towards an
unofficial one-party rule with the Partido Revolucionario Institucional stepping into control for
the entire second half of the 20th century. The nature of the Mexican government as 1960

approached was focused on centralized decision making. Adolfo Lopez Mateos was the first
president of this study’s time series of interest and typified the rule of his era of presidents. The
general theme of nationalization and redistribution was extremely strong. In 1960, electric
utilities were nationalized, and throughout the following years, many socialist policies were put
into place. These policies included land redistribution of 16 million hectares of land from private
farmers into communal farms known as ejidos. In addition, Lopez Mateos focused his energies
on promoting education within Mexico.
Educational improvements were a theme not only for Lopez Mateos, but also for many of
his successors. This focus on education should be viewed positively, as investments in human
capital are well documented to lead to high returns on the path of economic development. This
educational investment may have resulted from previous changes to the Mexican constitution
that stipulated the government’s promise to provide public education. Regardless, educational
attainment improved as a result of these policies. The primary education completion rate
increased to 93% in 2011 from 67% in 1975.
Figure 1: The primary completion rate of Mexico. Note: Missing data points are due to institutional changes in Mexican
education which resulted in poor recordkeeping for several years. Source: WDI, 2012.

% completing primary school

Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant
age group)
120
100

Primary completion rate,
total (% of relevant age
group)

80
60

Linear (Primary completion
rate, total (% of relevant age
group))

40
20
0

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

These policies resulted in strong economic growth for Mexico during the period that has
become known in Mexico as “el milagro Mexicana” (the Mexican miracle). Per capita GDP
grew rapidly, nearly quadrupling from 1960 to 1980, as can be seen in figure 2. In general this
trend has continued, even with several deep recessions in the 1980s. Overall, this positive growth
in GDP has turned Mexico into one of the top developing economies.

Figure 2: Per Capita GDP. Source: WDI, 2012
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Of course, it is also important to note some of the major failures of the Mexican
government during this same period of growth. Several policies of Lopez Mateos and his
successors were extremely unpopular, especially with the student population of Mexico. The
president that followed Lopez Mateos was Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, who continued most of the
policies that Lopez Mateos had put into place. Students did not approve. The tipping point came
in 1968, a year in which Mexico City (Mexico D.F) was scheduled to host the summer Olympic
Games. The student movement took this international attention to full advantage by staging
protests that culminated in a planned peaceful demonstration ten days before the Olympics were
scheduled to start. On that day, October 2nd, government troops were ordered by President Diaz
Ordaz to break up the student protests. These troops were commanded by the eventual successor
to Diaz Ordaz, Luis Echeverría Álvarez. The protests turned into a massacre when government
troops opened fire, killing dozens. In the aftermath, international disapproval of Mexico’s actions
was made clear, although the Olympics were still held. Little was done by the government of
Mexico to address the concerns of the student protesters and in general continued to exercise
relatively high levels of central control. As the century progressed, the government gradually
eased on some of its most controversial policies, especially land redistribution and anti-union
practices.

Figure 3 GDP Growth. Note: Gray shading indicates recession. Source: WDI, 2012
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The Tlatelolco massacre, as it became known, was only one of the major debacles of the
Mexican government. During the term of Echeverria Alvarez, the Mexican peso began its
massive devaluation. This devaluation spiraled out of control in the following presidencies.
Figure 4: Mexican Peso Exchange Rate. Source: Banco de Mexico
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Perhaps it was such sources of economic instability and government mismanagement that
led to increasing amounts of emigration during the 20th century. As can be seen when comparing
figures 3 and 5, recessionary periods are highly associated with periods of increased emigration.

Even in periods of relative prosperity however, emigration outflows are still much larger than
immigration inflows, as figure 5 shows.
Figure 5: Net Migration Note: The data is made up of five year averages reported in the World Development Indicators
Source: WDI, 2012
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Of the many factors that lead to migration, economic opportunity is often citied in anecdotes
related to emigration from Mexico.
Overall, Mexico’s history from 1960-2012 has resulted in substantial emigration from
their country. This emigration may have opened up opportunities abroad for emigrants that they
would not have had in their country of origin. Greater income levels abroad could allow for
money to be sent back to Mexico in the form of remittances. These remittances are hypothesized
to aid economic growth even though they originate outside of Mexico.
2.2 Global Remittance Trends
Across the globe, remittances have generally trended upwards in the past decades. This
could be partially attributed to changes in the definitions of remittances by the IMF 2. However,
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because of easing fees on remittances by most countries due to international pressure from
developed countries 3, there are certainly fewer incentives for workers not to send money home.
The size of remittance inflows in many countries relative to GDP is staggering. In India,
for example, $70 billion, or 4.3% of GDP was received from remittances in 2013. Other
countries show even larger percentages of remittances to GDP. Egypt’s remittance inflows made
up 8.4% of their GDP, and Bangladesh’s $14 billion of received remittances represented over 12%
of its GDP. The vast majority of remittances are received by developing countries, for which any
source of money is generally helpful. Of the $500 billion of received remittances worldwide,
over $400 billion go to developing economies.
Growth in remittances has been even more impressive in recent years. Pradhan et al.
(2008) found that global remittances have grown by approximately 8.8% per year from 1990 to
2005. Compare that statistic to growth in Gross World Product in the same period of only 4.66%
per year. This fast growth in remittances is especially strong in regions with relatively low
remittance costs, such as Southeast Asia.
Figure 6: From Pradhan et al. (2008) - Remittances by region. Source: Pradhan et al. (2008)

It seems likely that this trend of increasing remittances will continue into the future, as
remittances have become a part of household budgets for both immigrants and their families
back home. The current generation of immigrants is unlikely to reduce their remittances,
“Since 2009, the G20 has adopted a 5 x 5 goal of reducing remittance costs to 5 percentage points in 5 years.
Average remittance costs have fallen from roughly 12 per cent to around 9 per cent currently. But there is more
work to be done, especially in many South-South corridors and some low-volume North-South corridors involving
small countries.” (UN, 2013)
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especially as they and future generations become better situated in their new country.
Additionally, future generations are likely to continue to send remittances because of the nature
of increased connectivity between nations due to improvements in technology. Future
globalization will only serve to increase the ties between countries, with remittances serving as
one example of such interconnectedness.
2.3 Remittance Trends in Mexico
As shown in section 2.1, net migration in Mexico has been negative from 1960-2012
meaning that emigrants have outnumbered immigrants in that period. These emigrants have left
in vast numbers to the United States where opportunities to earn higher wages were greater. In
most cases emigrants are unable to bring their entire family along with them as they leave their
country of origin, and therefore usually have members of their family back home to help out with
remittances. The nature of immigration to the United States from Mexico is generally
challenging, resulting in this cross-border relationship becoming important.
Figure 7: Remittances and Net Migration in Mexico. Note: Scales are in different units. Source: WDI
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Personal remittances have a slightly different definition, and have only been recorded
since 1979 in Mexico, and in those years, remittances have been strictly increasing. The largest

period of remittance growth occurred during the economically unstable 1980s, where recessions
drove many Mexicans to emigrate to the United States and other countries.
Total remittances and annual GDP growth have an interesting relationship, as is shown in
figure 8. Although issues of scaling must be considered on this chart, it appears that periods of
economic slowdown were responded to by increasing rates of remittance growth.
Figure 8: Remittances and GDP Growth Source: WDI, 2012
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The above figure lacks the depth of an empirical analysis however, and although it shows
an interesting relationship, it does nothing to explain how strong this relationship is. Before an
empirical approach is presented for the purpose of showing this relationship in more concrete
terms, a brief review of related literature will be presented, and the data set will be described.
3.0 Literature Review
Discussion on the effects of remittances is robust in the literature. However, there is some
controversy on the effects of remittances on economic growth in particular. Much of this
controversy comes from the quality and availability of data on remittances. Pradhan et al. (2008)
noted that although the World Bank publishes figures on remittances, their numbers likely
underestimate the true figures. It was further suggested that remittances are often sent through

unofficial channels and would therefore be subject to the same type of understatement that GDP
experiences due to black market situations.
Setting aside the issue of data quality for a moment, there also are discrepancies in the
literature on the signs of the remittance coefficient. In many studies (Pradhan et al., 2008; Desai
et al. 2001; Faini, 2001; Taylor, 1992; and Stark and Lucas, 1988 to name a few) remittances are
found to have a positive effect on the economic growth of nations. On the other hand, other
studies are less clear cut on the issue. Chami et al. (2003) found evidence that remittances
actually have a negative effect on economic growth.
The differences in these seemingly disjoint views appear to relate to the empirical
strategies undertaken by authors. For example, Chami et al.(2003) was focused on the idea that
remittances may be forms of compensation in times of hardship rather than investment oriented
transfers, much like FDI. In such a case, remittance transfers should have a negative impact on
growth. To show this relationship more accurately, the study starts with a microeconomic model
of utility and builds it up to the aggregate level based on the belief that the decision to send a
remittance is a family cost-benefit trade-off. Stark and Lucas (1988) also believe that individual
actors are motivated by similar family-affecting variables. That said, the empirical model of
Chami et al. (2003) is actually very similar to those used in models finding positive relationships
between remittances and growth.
Studies after Chami et al.(2003) attempt to explain why remittances should have a
positive impact on economic growth instead of the negative one found in the 2003 paper. One
reason that the sign of the remittance coefficient may have been found to be negative is the
possible microeconomic underpinnings of remittances. Chami et al. (2003) assumed that
remittances act as a form of compensation, not investment, and should therefore not be strong
drivers of economic growth. The contrast of this can be found in Pradhan et al. (2008) where the
microeconomic factors that lead to macroeconomic remittance numbers are downplayed. In
Pradhan et al. (2008), the theoretical theme is centered around the idea that, in general,
remittances help developing economies in a two-fold manner. Remittances, in this view, are
simply a cash inflow that can bolster consumer spending with a multiplier effect on aggregate
demand. At the same time, the workers who migrate are usually lower income, less productive
workers in their home countries. When they migrate in search of higher wages, those who
succeed are able to send back a fraction of their new, much higher income, according to studies

who find positive remittance effects, will be a more efficient use of their labor than would
otherwise be possible without migration. It is possible that immigrants may be able to send back
more than their expected income without migration.
One much discussed variable in the literature is the lagged dependent variable. Its
inclusion is generally related to the fixed effects panel data technique but it also has theoretical
grounds as a variable for non-panel data. Solow (1956) predicts that countries with lower per
capita income will move towards a steady state more quickly than higher per capita income
countries. This suggests that when examining growth, the initial value of the economy must be
taken into account. Many studies (including Pradhan et al., 2008; Chami et al. 2003; Ramirez,
2012) find the lagged per capita GDP variable to have a negative coefficient, which follows the
prediction of the Solow model. However, it has also been suggested that the lagged dependent
variable may suffer from strong multicollinearity with other variables. High Variance Inflation
Factors were seen in Ziesemer (2010), but were found to be reduced when the specification was
changed to use a time lag of only one year instead of five.
In the traditional Solow model, the main variables of interest are capital, labor,
technology, investment, and population growth. These variables are seen as critical to explaining
economic growth. In Mankiw et al. (1992), human capital is also seen as a variable of
importance, adding the final variable to the standard growth model. Although all six of these
variables are highly important when examining economic growth, the practice of estimating
them can be difficult.
Investment is relatively straightforward as a variable. Pradhan et al. (2008) estimates that
a ten percent increase in the investment rate will increase economic growth by approximately
24%. Mankiw et al. (1992), meanwhile, estimated that for OECD countries a, 10% rise in the
investment rate would increase the rate of economic growth by 24%. The effect of capital,
excluding human capital, can also be estimated with relative ease. In the case of Mankiw et al.
(1992) capital’s share of income is shown to be .31 for non-oil producing countries. Mankiw et al.
(1992) noted more difficulty in capturing human capital, as a variable. Human capital should
account for health and educational factors that make the labor force more or less productive.
Unfortunately both health and education are difficult to quantify on the aggregate level.
Therefore as a proxy for human capital Mankiw et al.(1992), used the percentage of working age
population in secondary school. Many growth models including Pradhan et al. (2008) and Chami

et al. (2003) choose to simply exclude human capital altogether but this may lead to missing
variable bias. Another possible proxy for human capital
Another important augment to the traditional Solow model suggested in Pradhan et al.
(2008) is the inclusion of a polity measure to proxy for institutional effects. The Polity IV project
has developed a dataset that evaluates the relative levels of autocracy and democracy. Polity is
found by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score. Many studies have found
that political regimes do impact economic growth. However there is some disagreement on how
such regimes impact growth. According to Sirowy and Inkeles (1990) premature democracies
actually hinder growth. Other studies (Johnson 1964, Moore 1966, Huntington 1987) agree and
suggest that developing economies require high levels of autocracy to spur growth. On the other
hand many studies (including Hayek, 1944 and Friedman, 1972) argue that democracy aids
growth in developing countries. Pye (1966) even suggests that there is no relationship between
political regime and economic growth.
Additionally it is important to account for the general economic conditions in a nation
that can affect the GDP growth rate. Eichengreen (2008) suggests that it is important to include
exchange rates in growth regressions. He notes that appreciation of exchange rates can have a
negative effect on a developing economy. Hausmann et al. (2004) found that in 80 examples
where real growth increased by at least 2% that real depreciation had a significant and positive
effect.
Inflation is also considered to be an important variable to control for economic
conditions. Barro (2013) finds that in a sample of over 100 countries, all else held fixed, a 10%
increase in the inflation rate led to about a 20 basis point decrease in the real growth of GDP.
4.0 Data and Empirical Model
4.1 Data
The majority of this paper’s data was acquired from the World Development Indicators
compiled by the World Bank. The data are dated from 1961 to 2012. The relevant descriptive
data for the data set can be found in figure 9. Polity data on regimes was acquired from the Polity
IV project which bases their data on observations collected by a team of researchers about the
political regimes of the world.

Figure 9: Summary Statistics for the Data. Sources: WDI (2012); Polity IV (2012)
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One interesting point on the variables is the high variability that they exhibit, with
standard deviations that are relatively large compared to the values of the variables. More
observations would be preferable, and perhaps in the future data will be available farther back in
time as well as the addition of future new years.
4.2 Model Specification
As can be seen in equation 1, Chami et al. (2003) used a panel data specification that
attempts to capture the decision of whether or not families send remittances.

𝛥𝛥𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎0𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑎𝑎1𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎2𝛥𝛥𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(1)

Where the effect of workers remittances are estimated by the α2 parameter, I represents
investment, and ncpf is for net private capital flows. Additionally, all variables are taken as
logarithms. Using this model, Chami et al. (2003) estimated the α2 parameter to be equal to
−0.013 and found it to be statistically significant at the 5% level.
Pradhan et al. (2008) used a similar specification but included different variables that
implied the idea that institutions have a strong effect on the decision making process of families
while they decide to send remittances. In particular, measures of trade openness and political
structure were used to control for institutional differences between countries and years. Pradhan
et al. (2008) also differed slightly in functional form. Although logs of the dependent variable,
lagged dependent variable, and remittances were used, openness and investment were used as
fractions of GDP.
∆𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (2)
The above model, while similar to that of Chami et al. (2003) may eliminate some

missing variable bias which could explain why Chami et al. (2003) found a negative coefficient

of the remittance parameter estimation. Using the improved specification in (2) Pradhan et al.
(2008) found that, on average and holding other variables constant, a one percent increase in
remittances would increase per capita GDP by .34%.
However, this specification may still exhibit some missing variable bias. It does nothing
to account for human capital, exchange rates, or inflation. This study will use the specification of
Pradhan et al. (2008) as a starting point, and will augment it to account for the health component
of human capital, as well as accounting for exchange rates, and inflation. The model is shown
below in equation 3.
log(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 ) = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 log(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1 ) + 𝛽𝛽2 log(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 ) + 𝛽𝛽3 log(𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ) + 𝛽𝛽4 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡

(3)

+𝛽𝛽5 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 +𝛽𝛽6 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽8 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡

For: t ={1961,1962…,2012}

Where: log(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 ) is the natural logarithm of per capita GDP, log(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1 ) is the natural

logarithm of GDP per capita with a time lag of one year, log(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 ) is the natural logarithm of
remittances, log(𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ) is the natural logarithm of investment, which is proxied by gross fixed

capital formation, 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 is exports as a percentage of GDP, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 is the polity score, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is
consumer goods price inflation, 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 is the official exchange rate of pesos to US dollars, and
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 is the fertility rate.

However, based on evidence from Ziesemer (2010), the model will also be estimated

without the lagged dependent variable because of its possible collinearity with the remittance
variable. The danger of dropping this variable is in increasing omitted variable bias and ignoring
an important factor in economic growth. The issue of multicollinearity may be unavoidable in
the optimal specification. The standard interpretation of the Solow model would suggest that the
initial level of GDP would be important in determining economic growth and that a lower initial
level of growth would lead to faster convergence to a steady state level of income. This would be
indicated by a negative coefficient.
As was previously discussed, the main variable of interest is challenging to predict the
coefficient of. However, it seems likely that the sign will be positive for the case of Mexico
because of the relatively high volume of remittances that flow into Mexico.
In particular, it is important to note the theoretical significance of the investment variable.
The Solow model shows that per capita income is a function of investment as well as population,

technology, and depreciation. The investment variable in this study is proxied by gross capital
formation. The effect of investment is expected to be strong and positive in nature.
In the Pradhan et al. (2008) specification, the measure of openness is taken as a log of
exports but in equation 3, openness is proxied by exports as a percentage of GDP. Although the
difference is subtle, by using exports as a percentage of GDP, the effect of the size of an
economy on the variable can be controlled. Failure to account for this could bias the results. It is
unclear whether or not the effect of increasing levels of openness will provide a boost to GDP or
not. It seems possible that a more open economy could have some disadvantages as far as the
internal stability of Mexico is concerned. A more export oriented economy will tend to work to
keep low wages. However gains from trade will be a boost to economic growth. Whether or not
these two effects offset each other is unclear.
Exchange rates will likely be negatively related with economic growth. High levels of
devaluation in currency reduce consumer confidence and can also serve to discourage investment
from abroad from businesses looking for a stable economic environment. That said, devaluing
currency does have a benefit in terms of international trade, allowing a country with undervalued
currency to act as a low cost producer. This would suggest that there is a somewhat ambiguous
relationship between exchange rates and economic growth.
Inflation should negatively affect economic growth. Andres and Hernando (1999) found a
significant negative relationship between inflation and economic growth. Barro (2013) also
found a statistically significant negative relationship between inflation and economic growth.
The fertility rate in this study is used as a proxy for human capital accumulation. Mankiw
et al. (1992) found that human capital accounts for about one third of the production function
given by 𝑌𝑌(𝐾𝐾, 𝐻𝐻, 𝐿𝐿) = 𝐾𝐾 1/3 𝐻𝐻1/3 𝐿𝐿1/3 . Barro (2013) also used the fertility rate as a proxy for

human capital and found a negative coefficient. It is expected that decreasing the fertility rate
will increase per capita GDP growth. The fertility rate is higher when people are less educated
and have less access to healthcare. Therefore, a decrease in the fertility rate indicates an increase
in human capital. The expected coefficient of fertility is thusly negative. For additional
information on the variables of this study please turn to Appendix I.
5.0 Empirical Results
After OLS estimation, the effect of remittances on the growth rate of per capita GDP
appears to be positive in nature. However, as was expected, the most significant determinant of

per capita GDP growth was investment. Additionally, inflation and fertility were found to be
highly significant. The results of the three models are displayed below in Appendix II. Model 1
was the Pradhan et al. (2008) specification, model 2 was specified in equation 3 above, and the
third model is the same as model 2 but without a time lagged per capita GDP growth as an
independent variable.
Overall, the best statistical regression was the based on the third specification. However,
the strongest theoretical model is the second specification because it does not omit the
theoretically important lagged dependent variable. Unfortunately, the statistical issues with the
third specification made the remittance variable statistically insignificant. Dropping the variable
did not cause any change in the results of the Ramsey RESET test. The difference in significance
of the Ramsey RESET test between the Pradhan et al. (2008) specification and the specification
in equation 3 is strong. This indicates the presence of omitted variable bias in the first of the
three specifications. The sign of the bias is positive.
By all appearances the lagged dependent variable suffers from statistical issues that
prevent it from significance. Lagged per capita GDP may be more effective in panel data
techniques or simply with more observations. In contrast, the natural log of investment is shown
to be highly significant even at the .001% level. Given a 10% increase in investment, there is
expected to be an approximately 5% increase in per capita GDP all else held fixed. Such a result
matches the expected sign.
Polity was only statistically significant in the first specification; however the sample
evidence does seem to suggest a weak positive effect for a higher polity score. This does seem to
fit expectations of some economists such as Friedman and Hayek that freedom results in higher
levels of economic prosperity. In Mexico’s case, polity changes may simply have been less
significant in determining output, perhaps because of Mexico’s close economic relationship with
the United States the impact of the Mexican political regime is lessened as its mistakes can be
subsidized by trade benefits. Additionally, there were many effective policies undertaken during
the less free political regimes in Mexico. Perhaps these balanced out the negative effects of
reduced freedom. It is also important to note that Mexico did become more stable over time,
which certainly contributed to a stronger economy.
Exports and openness were also statistically insignificant. They are important to
Mexico’s growth in theory but perhaps the data quality was not high enough to capture the

effectiveness. For one thing, trade between Mexico and the U.S is somewhat underestimated
because of the size of the underground economy. Multicollinearity could also have been an issue
from a statistical standpoint, as both variables exhibited high variance inflation factors.
The official exchange rate was statistically insignificant and exhibited evidence of
multicollinearity. It had a variance inflation factor of over sixty. Perhaps an alternative way to
account for purchasing power differences would have been to change the units of the other
variables into purchasing power parity adjusted values. That said, the sample evidence does
indicate a possible weak negative relationship between exchange rates and economic growth.
Depreciation of a currency may weaken trade, but it also may enable the nation to become a low
cost producer. Mexico benefited overall from their strategy of devaluing the Mexican peso.
Inflation is highly correlated with the exchange rate and could be the source of some of
the multicollinearity. Results indicate that, all else held equal, a ten percent increase in inflation
will result in a .01 percent decrease in per capita GDP. A negative relationship between inflation
and growth was expected because inflation can decrease aggregate demand by increasing
uncertainty in extreme cases. With a median inflation rate of over 9% it comes as no surprise that
it negatively affected growth.
The fertility rate served as a proxy for human capital accumulation. Decreasing the
fertility rate by 1 led to a .09% increase in per capita GDP all else held constant. This negative
relationship indicates the importance of both education and health for an economy. Fertility rates
can be lowered by providing adequate healthcare, and by increasing the education level. The
fertility rate was found to be statistically significant at the 1% level.
The main variable of interest was remittances. Unfortunately, because of some issues
with multicollinearity, it was statistically insignificant in specification 2. When the lagged
dependent variable was dropped, remittances became significant at the 10% level. Remittances
exhibited a positive relationship with economic growth. All else held constant a 10% increase in
remittances is expected to raise per capita GDP by .6%. This positive relationship may suggest
that receiving remittances can provide a subtle boost to aggregate demand. The mechanism may
be a variety of factors. Increased consumer confidence seems a likely candidate to explain why a
positive relationship exists. Perhaps when families receive money from their relatives abroad it
gives them hope that they will be able to better their lives. Long term this additional consumer

confidence will tend to build on itself, allowing for better economic growth due to consistent
remittances.
6.0 Conclusions
This study sought to better understand the relationship between economic growth and
remittances. In doing so, some statistical issues limited the power of the models used to estimate
the relationship. At best, given the sample evidence, there is a weakly positive effect from
remittances on economic growth. Part of the inability of the study to fully grasp whether or not
there is a causal relation between remittances and growth may be due to weaknesses in the
available data. The newer IMF definition of remittances was unavailable before 1979, and
education data was scarce in Mexico. However, the very existence of a positive effect could
indicate that remittances do provide a boost to output, especially in the long term where
consistent remittance flows become powerful. At the micro level, remittances are of course not
consistent. Sometimes, family members abroad have money to send back home, and sometimes
they don’t. At the aggregate level, some of this inconsistency may have led to a reduced effect on
economic growth.
From a policy standpoint it is unclear how to take advantage of remittances. For one thing,
because they are inconsistent at the family level, they have relatively small effects from year to
year. It is only in the long term that the inconsistencies can be smoothed over. In order to work
with that possible relationship, a government would need to provide a stable environment that
maximizes the benefit of any additional income for households.
Statistically, further study is needed, especially panel data studies on remittances and
growth. Although there are weaknesses to panel data, gaining additional observations would give
panel data studies much more power. However, it was shown in this study’s regression that it is
important to account for human capital development, such as with a proxy like the fertility rate.
Other important human capital variables were not included due to unavailable data. For instance,
education expenditures and outcomes would have been valuable additions to the model. Future
studies on remittances should more closely reflect reality by including more of the possible
variables that may have been omitted.
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Appendix I: Variables and Descriptions
Variable
Economic
Growth
Lagged Growth
Remittances
Investment
Trade Openness
Polity
Exports
Inflation
Exchange Rate
Fertility Rate

Title

Description

Unit

Expected
Sign

log_y

Log of per capita

Current USD

N/A

Log of per capita GDP with a
log_ytimelag timelag of 1
log_remitt
Log of remittances
log_inv
Log of gross capital formation
log_open
log of exports
polity
Polity score
exports
Exports as a percentage of GDP
inf
Inflation of consumer prices
exrate
Local currency per USD
fert
Babies per mother

Current USD
Current USD
Current USD
Current USD
-10 to 10
% GDP
annual %
Ratio
Babies

+
+
+
+
+
+
-

Appendix II: Regression Results

Log_yTIMELAG
log_remitt
Log_INV
Log_OPEN
POLITY
EXPORTS

(1)
Log_y
0.0218
(0.34)
0.0673**
(2.02)
0.614***
(13.28)
-0.0201
(-0.37)
0.0171*
(2.37)

(2)
Log_y
0.00706
(0.13)
0.0625
(1.50)
0.561***
(16.24)

(3)
Log_y

-8.334***
(-13.96)
52
0.0003

0.00951
(1.10)
-0.00660
(-1.23)
-0.00145***
(-3.00)
-0.000860
(-0.07)
-0.0913***
(-3.12)
-6.764***
(-8.44)
51
0.4299

0.00956
(1.12)
-0.00672
(-1.28)
-0.00145***
(-3.03)
-0.000481
(-0.04)
-0.0913***
(-3.16)
-6.818***
(-9.97)
51
0.4626

** p<0.05

*** p<0.01"

INF
EXRATE
FERT
cons
N
RESET p-value
t statistics in parentheses
="* p<0.10

0.0648*
(1.73)
0.563***
(19.32)

Monetary Policy

Pre-crisis monetary policy:
• Inflation Concerns
• Unsustainable growth concerns

– Policy was tending towards slightly contractionary

Price Stability

Employment

Monetary Policy
During the crisis:
• Plunged interest rates
• Concerns about deflation, unemployment
• Quantitative Easing
– Goals:
• Supporting asset values
• Increasing excess reserves

• Bolster Consumer
Confidence/Spending
• Stabilize Employment

Monetary Policy

Monetary Policy

Employment

Home Prices

Monetary Policy
Other Fed Actions During Crisis:
• Qualitative Easing
• Term Auction Facility (TAF) and Term Asset
Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF)
• Interest on Bank Reserves
Pseudo-Monetary Policy:
• AIG bailout of $85 billion

Monetary Policy
Current Policy
• Concerns about deflation
• Continued “accommodative monetary policy”

Has Anything Changed?
What HAS changed:
• Consumer Credit is more difficult to get
• Many states are offering foreclosure
mediation, sub-prime mortgages are
decreasing in delinquency
• The Volker Rule of the Dodd-Frank Act
What HASN’T:
• Complex financial products that bundle home
loans still exist

Subprime Loans
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Based on data from the Mortgage Banker's National Delinquency Survey

Based on data from the Mortgage Banker's National Delinquency Survey

Norwegian Oil:

Sean Lambert

Norway
•
•
•
•

Population: 5.31 million
GDP: $282 billion (PPP) = $515 billion (current USD)
Gini Coefficient: 0.25
Petroleum Production: 215 million saleable units of o.e
• 1.9 million barrels of oil per day

• Long Term Unemployment: 0.4%

Oil Production Growth

• In late 1969 the first Norwegian Oil field was discovered in the
North Sea.

Sverdrup Oil Field was the first and is still one of the
largest oil fields in the North Sea.

What Oil Did For Norway

• The Norwegian Pension Fund is drawn from taxes on oil
production.
• The last reported size of the fund is $838 billion U.S dollars at the
end of 2013.

• Last year’s Norwegian GDP was only 60% of the value of the
oil fund.
• Norway is one of the strongest welfare states.
• They provide healthcare, education, and virtually guaranteed
employment.

What Oil Did For Norway

• Norwegians are among the self reported happiest people in
the world. (Based on OECD)
• Norwegians feel extremely secure in their future. (Based on
OECD).
• “When asked to rate their general satisfaction with life on a
scale from 0 to 10, Norwegians gave it a 7.7 grade, one of the
highest scores in the OECD, where average life satisfaction is
of 6.6.” (OECD)

Happiness and Income?

• Why do Norwegians seem so happy? Is it their incomes?
• According to Easterlin (1994) happiness is not improved if
incomes are raised across the board.
• In a rebuttal to Easterlin (1994), Hagerty and Veenhoven (2003)
found that growth in national income does increase happiness.
• Which is the more accurate view?

• Norway’s happiness is likely the result of multiple factors, and
certainly their wealth plays into it.

Norway vs. the Rest of
Scandinavia

• Before the oil boom, Norway’s growth was at a slower pace
than its neighbors Denmark and Sweden.
• After the oil boom, Norway caught up and surpassed its
neighbors.

A table from Erling
Larsen.

Avoiding the Natural Resource
Curse
• Larsen (2003) points out that it would be expected for
Norway’s economy to get distorted by rent-seeking in its oil
industry

• According to Larsen (2003) this result was not seen because the
profits on oil was kept down through government intervention.

Dangers for Norway’s Future

• As opposed to the Swedish development strategy, Norway
relied on luck much more than its neighbor.
• Oil reserves will eventually run out.
• Norway has a small population which would prevent it from
labor intensive jobs in the future.
• Even if the pension fund is well managed, there is the
possibility that it could be drawn down
• If it is mis-managed, it has no chance to support the nation

Source: WDI, 2012

Tapering Off Oil

Source: WDI, 2012

Tapering Off Oil

Source: WDI, 2012

Conclusions

• Norway was fortunate to find oil in their backyard
• The Pension Fund is well managed and extremely large, and it
does not need to support that many people
• Norway’s neighbor’s have managed without oil profits
• Norway will likely maintain its place as a highly developed,
content nation barring war or major natural disaters.

Questions?
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